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The purpose of this paper is to draw out a little noticed, but (I think)
correct and important, consequence of David Lewis’s theory of how the val-
ues of contextual parameters are determined. According to Lewis (1979),
these values are often determined at least in part by accommodation; to a first
approximation, the idea is that contextual parameters tend to take on the
values they need to have in order for our utterances to be true. The little-
noticed consequence of Lewis’s way of developing these ideas is that what
we say is determined in part by the way the conversation unfolds after our
utterance.1 That is, Lewisian accommodation entails a non-standard form
of externalism, according to which what we say is determined not only not
only by factors internal to us at the time of our utterance, nor even by truths
about our physical or social environment at the time of utterance or by our
history, but also by truths about our future – truths about times after the
time of our utterance. Moreover, seeing this consequence clearly lets us re-
fine and improve upon Lewis’s account of when accommodation can occur.
Before I begin, let me lay out a few assumptions to ease the discussion
to follow. I take a context to be an ordered sequence, with the elements of
the sequence corresponding to specific context sensitive expressions; for
example, the sequence might consist of an element corresponding to “I”,
an element corresponding to “you” , an element corresponding to “that”, an
element corresponding to “tall”, and so on.2 In some cases, these elements
may be the extension of the corresponding expression (e.g., the element
corresponding to “I” may be an individual, the speaker), while in other cases
the semantic values of the expressions may allude to these elements in some
other way (e.g., we will assume that the element corresponding to “tall” is not
the extension, but a degree of height – the standard that something must
meet to count as “tall” in the context).
I am also going to assume that the semantic values of sentences are func-
1I say “little noticed” rather than “unnoticed” because Mark Richard points out, in a dis-
cussion of Lewis, that “our conversational behavior presupposes that what transpires in a
conversation at a time t may effect the interpretation of predicates used in contributions to
the conversation completed (long) before t” (1995: 565) – which is very close to the view
I will go on to discuss. But Richard adds an important complication, which (I will claim) is
both unnecessary and problematic. I discuss this complication in section 2, below.
2For discussion of this sort of view of context, see Lewis (1970: 24, 62-5), Braun (1996:
161), Ball (2017: 108-9).
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tions from contexts to propositions, and that these propositions serve as the
content of speech acts such as assertion.3 (So, on the view I am taking for
granted, semantic values are somethingmuch like Kaplan’s characters.) The
idea that semantic values relate so straightforwardly to contents is controver-
sial (Ninan (2010); Rabern (2012); Rabern & Ball (forthcoming) ), and I
am adopting it only for the sake of simplicity; nothing substantive about what
I have to say would change if we adopted a different idea of what semantic
values are and how they relate to content.
Since semantic facts are not brute, the values of this elements of the con-
text will be determined by some facts about the speaker and her audience,
and their environment broadly construed. Exactly which facts matter is a dif-
ficult question; this paper aims to make the case that facts about the future
matter, but leaves the question of which other facts matter open. Kaplan
(1989: 573-4) famously distinguishes between descriptive semantics (which
aims to say what expressions mean) and metasemantics (which aims to ex-
plain why expressions have the meanings they do), and I take the question
of how the elements of the context are determined to bemetasemantic (per-
haps in a somewhat extended sense).
1 Lewis on Accommodation
David Lewis (1979) defended a metasemantics on which a range of contex-
tual factors relevant to determining the truth value of assertions – what he
called the conversational score, which would include the elements of what
we are calling the context – tends to shift (as Lewis says, “ceteris paribus and
within limits”) so as to make assertions true. Lewis calls this metaseman-
tic mechanism accommodation. Lewis motivates accommodation by appeal to
a range of examples; we will focus on a subset of his cases, those involving
gradable adjectives like “flat” and “hexagonal”. These adjectives are context-
sensitive; what counts as “flat” in one situation (say, one in which we are
building a road) will not count as “flat” in another (say, one in which we are
sanding a table-top). But what sets the standard? What determines how flat
something has to be to count as “flat” in a given situation? Lewis’s view is an
attempt to give a partial answer to these questions.
To a first approximation, Lewis’s idea is that if I say “France is hexago-
nal”, that tends to make it the case that “hexagonal” as I use it is correctly
applied to France (i.e., the parameter of the context associated with “hexago-
nal” (call it chexagonal) is such that France is more hexagonal than chexagonal),
and likewise, if I say “Hamburg is flat”, that tends to make it the case that
“flat” as I use it correctly applies to Hamburg.4 He generalises these exam-
3In this respect I am being untrue to Lewis’s own views; see his (1980).
4Lewis suggests that what is at issue in these examples is a “standard of precision”. I am
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ples into the following scheme:
If at time t something is said that requires component sn, of
conversational score to have a value in the range r if what is said
is to be true, or otherwise acceptable; and if sn, does not have a
value in the range r just before t; and if such-and-such further
conditions hold; then at t the score-component sn, takes some
value in the range r. (1979: 347)
Before we proceed, we should clarify Lewis’s aim in this passage. Locu-
tions like “what is said” are often used in the literature to talk about content
– what is asserted by an utterance. If we read “something is said” and “what
is said” in the quoted passage in this way, then Lewis’s idea might be para-
phrased as follows: suppose an utterance expresses a certain proposition.
This proposition has particular truth conditions; and it may turn out to be
true just in case the conversational score is a certain way. On this under-
standing of what is going on, a proposition is expressed prior to, and inde-
pendently of, accommodation, and accommodation makes it the case that that
proposition is true; or in other words, first an assertion is made, and then
accommodation happens.
This can’t be what Lewis intended. The idea isn’t that a particular con-
tent is expressed, and then the conversational score shifts so as to make that
content true. (For example, suppose that contents are the sort of thing that
is true or false at a world. On most views, when we are evaluating whether
an assertion is true, we evaluate its content at the world in which it is made;
no further element of the conversational score is relevant to this evaluation,
and only in an unusual situation would we evaluate it at some other world so
as to understand it as true. Of course, if I say something about the conver-
sation – for example, that I am the speaker, or that we have adopted a strict
standard for what will count as hexagonal – then there is a sense in which
whether the content I assert is true depends on the conversational score.
But this is a rather unusual case, and anyway it is not very plausible to think
that in general the conversational score will shift to make my assertion true
in this kind of case.) Rather, a better gloss on Lewis’s idea is that content –
what proposition is asserted – depends on the context. For example, when
I say, “You are a child”, whether I express a proposition that is true just in
case Ansel is a child or a proposition that is true just in case Magnus is a
updating Lewis’s treatment to bemore in line with contemporary views of gradable adjectives
such as Kennedy & McNally (2005). In any case, it seems clear both that there is not a single
standard of precision relevant to all gradable adjectives in a context, and also that “precision”
is not the right way to describe the standards relevant to many gradable adjectives. (There is
no such thing as being precisely tall or precisely beautiful.)
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child depends on whether the element of the context associated with “you”
is Ansel or Magnus.
In cases of accommodation, then, the conversational score shifts so as
to make it the case that a particular, true content is expressed. For exam-
ple, suppose that France is more hexagonal than clow, but less hexagonal
than chigh. Then the idea is that when I say “France is hexagonal”, accom-
modation can make it the case that I express the proposition that France is
more hexagonal than clow, rather than the proposition that France is more
hexagonal than chigh. So I take it that the schema should be read along the
following lines:
If at time t an assertion is made that requires component sn,
of conversational score to have a value in the range r if it is to
be the case that a true (or otherwise acceptable) proposition
is asserted; and if sn, does not have a value in the range r just
before t; and if such-and-such further conditions hold; then at
t the score-component sn, takes some value in the range r
Accommodation doesn’t always work; it isn’t as though I can always speak
truly by saying “France is hexagonal”, nomatter what. The describedmecha-
nism only operates in certain circumstances – if “such-and-such further con-
ditions” obtain. Among the “such-and-such further conditions” are that the
assertion must not be contested in the conversation; as Lewis says, “at least,
that is what happens if your conversational partners tacitly acquiesce” (1979:
339). If you say “France is hexagonal” and I reply, “Yes, and Italy is boot-
shaped”, then the parameters of the list context relevant to both of our as-
sertions tend to adjust in such a way that our assertions come out true; but
if I reply, “No, you’re wrong, its borders are actually quite irregular – just
look at how Brittany sticks out”, then the parameters of the context will not
so adjust. For now, let’s take “such-and-such further conditions” to pick out
the following:
Such-and-such further conditions (SSFC1) “your conversational partners tac-
itly acquiesce” – i.e., no one objects.
We will go on to refine SSFC1 in the next section. Before we do that, it is
worth observing that even on this plain version of Lewis’s view, the “such-and-
such further conditions” introduce an element of backwards determination:
the parameters of the list context relevant to your utterance at t depend
in part on my reaction to your utterance after t. Whether you say (truth-
fully) that France is hexagonal-by-low-standards, or (falsely) that France is
hexagonal-by-high-standards, is not determined just by you (e.g., by your in-
tentions, beliefs, or other attitudes, or by your dispositions); it is determined
by what happens after your utterance, by whether I go along with you or ob-
ject.
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2 Extending and Improving Lewis’s Account
We should not expect an exhaustive specification of the conditions under
which accommodation will take place. Even a fully developed principle
along the lines Lewis sketches will only be true ceteris paribus; metasemantics
is complicated, and we should expect that there may be exceptional cases
where factors outside the scope of any given model intervene. (Who knows
what will happen to the conversational score when theMartianmind-control
rays strike, or the LSD kicks in?) So we should not expect to be able to draw
out the further conditions in full detail.
Despite this, it is clear that we can do better than Lewis’s suggestion;
the matter is not as simple as SSSFC1 suggests, because it is not settled by
an interlocutor’s first reaction. To see this, consider the difference between
the continuation of Castorp and Settembrini’s disagreement in (2) and (1):
(1) Castorp: Hamburg is flat.
Settembrini: It is not; it has many small hills!
Castorp: Ah, I see your point. I thought that Hamburg was flat, but
I was wrong.
(2) Castorp: Hamburg is flat.
Settembrini: It is not; it has many small hills!
Castorp: Look, of course it has some small hills. But that doesn’t
really matter – there are lots of reasons to think it is flat. Bicycling
is easy there, etc.
Settembrini: Aha, point taken! I was mistaken: Hamburg is flat after
all.
In (1), Castorp accepts Settembrini’s correction. In this kind of case,
I submit, it is very natural to see Castorp’s initial assertion as incorrect and
Settembrini’s response as correct; after all, this is the considered judgment
of all the parties to the dispute. In (2), on the other hand, Castorp rejects
Settembrini’s correction, continues to defend his initial assertion, and it is
Settembrini who concedes. In this kind of case, it is very natural to see Cas-
torp’s initial assertion as correct and Settembrini’s response as incorrect;
again, this is what Castorp and Settembrini themselves come to judge.
Now the judgment we have just given about (1) fits well with (SSFC1).
(Castorp’s utterance is not accommodated – the context does not adjust so
as to make him express a truth – and this fact would be explained given
(SSFC1) by the fact that Settembrini objects). But the judgment we have
given about (2) does not. In (2), Settembrini objects and Castorp’s assertion
is ultimately accommodated nonetheless – the context does adjust so as to
make Castorp express a truth, despite Settembrini’s objection. So whether
an assertion plays a list-fixing role is determined not only by interlocutors’
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first responses, but by their considered judgment – by the resolution of the
debate:
Such-and-such further conditions 2 (SSFC2) Your conversational partners ac-
quiesce – tacitly or explicitly, immediately or after discussion (i.e., the
considered judgment of all parties to the conversation is that you were
right).
Integrating (SSFC2) into an explicit account will yield something like the
following:
The Extended Lewisian Model If at time t an assertion ismade that requires
component sn, of conversational score to have a value in the range r
if it is to be the case that a true (or otherwise acceptable) content is
asserted; and if sn, does not have a value in the range r just before t;
then: (i) if the considered judgment of the parties to the conversation
is that the assertion is true; then at t sn takes some value in the range r;
but (ii) if the considered judgment of the parties to the conversation
is that the assertion was not true then then at t sn takes some value
outside the range r.
These considerations also help us see what is wrong with the suggestion
(made by Mark Richard) that in cases of accommodation, we need to look
at two distinct contexts: “there is every reason to say that in the sort of case
we are considering, the utterance occurs in at least two contexts. For it oc-
curs within the context established by [the speaker’s] utterance at the time
he makes it (we might call this the utterance’s local context), and it occurs
within the global context determined by the conversation taken as a whole”
(1995: 566). I would argue on the contrary that the “local context” has no
role substantial role to play in the story. Perhaps the clearest way to see this
is by considering the metasemantics of the local context. Exactly what fixes
the values of the elements of the local context? One natural proposal would
be the speaker’s intentions; it is unclear what other options there might be.
If that is correct, then relative to the local context, Castorp asserts a truth
– he is under no illusions about the topography of Hamburg, and intends
to use “flat” in such a way that Hamburg counts as “flat”. Settembrini is in
a position to know this; so this proposition cannot be what his objection is
addressing when he says, “You’re wrong”. (It is not as though he accepts
Castorp’s utterance as true and decides to object anyway; no, he thinks that
Castorp is wrong, speaking falsely, and is going to try to show it.) But this
leaves no work for the local context to do: it is not what the audience under-
stands, not what is addressed even by the first response. I therefore maintain
that Richard’s multiplication of contexts does no work beyond that which is
done by the Extended Lewisian Model, and that it should be rejected.
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3 Justification of the Extended Lewisian Model
The Extended Lewisian Model makes good sense of the contrast between
examples like (1) and examples like (2). That is interesting, but may seem
a small benefit given that the view appeals to a mechanism that some may
feel is extremely counterintuitive. Does the idea have anything else to rec-
ommend it?
A number of theorists have claimed that in at least some cases of dispute
such as (1) and (2), at least part of what is at issue is how we should talk
(see e.g. Plunkett & Sundell (2013)). These theorists point out that we
may in some sense agree on the facts about the topography of Hamburg –
we may have the topographical map before us – and may still enter into a
disputes like (1) and (2). In this case, it looks like we cannot be disputing
about a matter of fact. Plausibly, part of what Castorp is trying to do is to
get Settembrini to use “flat” in a particular way; and likewise, part of what
Settembrini is trying to do is to get Castorp to use “flat” in a particular way.
This observation is clearly compatible with the ExtendedLewisianModel:
if Settembrini can convince Castorp, this will play a role in making it the
case that Castorp used “flat” with a particular meaning, and it seems safe to
assume that this in turn will play a role in shaping his future uses (and sim-
ilarly if Castorp can convince Settembrini). But there is a further datum to
be made sense of: the parties to the dispute give arguments in the attempt
to convince each other, and these arguments often do not bear in a straight-
forward way on the use of words. For example, consider Settembrini’s con-
tention that Hamburg is not flat because it has small hills, or Castorp’s con-
tention that Hamburg is flat because bicycling is easy there. These are sen-
sible contributions to the conversation, contributions that might make us
adopt particular views about the topography of Hamburg. But, except in
some special cases (e.g., where are undertaking a bicycling holiday and have
implicitly agreed that all and only places suitable for bicycling are to be called
“flat”), they do not seem like good reasons to use the word “flat” in a partic-
ular way. There must be more to the story.
The most straightforward way to make sense of conversations like (1)
and (2) is that the parties to these conversations are giving arguments, try-
ing to provide (at least pro tanto) reasons to believe some conclusion; and
that at least in many cases these are good arguments. Now, of course it isn’t
that we want every argument anyone ever gives to be a good argument. We
sometimes make mistakes; in many cases, these may go by undetected, but
in others we will look back on our own arguments and find them wanting
– for example, as we imagine Settembrini doing in (1). But in many cases,
we look back on our own arguments and find no fault with them. Ideally,
we should want a view that vindicates our considered judgments about our
arguments.
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I claim that the Extended LewisianModel does exactly that. It makes our
arguments good in the following sense: to the extent that we are rational,
when we look back on a dispute that has resolved, the arguments that we
take to be good will in fact be good, and the arguments we take to be bad
will in fact be bad. To get a sense of why this should be so, let’s look more
closely at the exchange that begins (1):
(3) Castorp: Hamburg is flat.
Settembrini: It is not; it has many small hills!
At the beginning of the conversation, Castorp intends to use “flat” in such
a way that Hamburg counts as “flat”, the fact that a city has small hills is no
reason (or at most a very weak reason) to think that it is not “flat”, and the
fact that bicycling in a city is easy is a good reason to think that it is “flat”.
Settembrini, by contrast, intends to use “flat” in such a way that the fact that
a city has small hills is a good reason to think that it is not “flat”, and (hence)
that Hamburg is not “flat”. Of course, given the Extended Lewisian Model,
these intentions are not decisive; so we do not have enough information to
say whether Settembrini’s argument is a good one. If the argument contin-
ues as in (2):
(4) Castorp: Ah, I see your point. I thought that Hamburg was flat, but
I was wrong.
Then Castorp and Settembrini will look back on Settembrini’s argument as a
good one; and given what “flat” means (and meant, even in Castorp’s initial
utterance), the argument will in fact be a good one. If, on the other hand,
the argument continues as in (1):
(5) Castorp: Look, of course it has some small hills. But that doesn’t
really matter – there are lots of reasons to think it is flat. Bicycling
is easy there.
Settembrini: Aha, point taken! I was mistaken: Hamburg is flat after
all.
Then both parties will look back on Settembrini’s argument as a bad one;
and given what “flat” means (and meant all along), it will in fact be a bad
one. (And similarly both parties will look back on Castorp’s argument to the
effect that Hamburg is flat because cycling is easy there as a good one, and
so it will be.) So Backwards-Looking Meta-Contextualism vindicates exactly
those arguments that the disputants take to be vindicated at the end of the
dispute.
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4 Conclusion
The extended Lewisian meta-semantics presented here thus does a good job
of making sense of the way we argue and evaluate our own arguments, while
also vindicating the idea that many debates turn on questions of meaning.
No doubt it raises further issues; but exploring these is a task for further
work.5;6
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